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Abstract 
Tax scholars have long suggested that tax competition should be 
mitigated because it reduces the collective revenues of countries, 
impairs their ability to redistribute wealth, and produces more 
regressive tax systems. Likewise, international organizations such as 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) and the European Union increasingly move towards 
designing a global framework aimed at reducing tax avoidance and 
mitigating tax competition. 
However, there is no comprehensive discussion on the costs that 
would arise from institutional reform designed to tackle tax 
competition. To the extent that any change in the international tax 
order will benefit some countries but also harm others, an ethical 
analysis of tax competition should include an examination of how to 
distribute the losses resulting from overall institutional reform. As 
international policy decisions tend to reproduce the present imbalance 
of the global power, the lack of an explicit discussion on how to share 
the costs arising from an institutional change might result in countries 
with less negotiating power bearing most of these costs. 
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This Article introduces the costs side of curbing tax competition 
and offers four normative principles that can help illuminate how the 
burdens of reforming the current international tax regime should be 
shared among countries.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Right and responsibility are commonly conceived of as two sides 
of the same moral coin. However, determining the existence of a right 
might not easily lead to who bears the responsibility to ensure it. It has 
long been argued that tax competition should be mitigated, as it results 
in more regressive national tax systems and impairs countries’ capacity 
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to redistribute wealth.1 Scholars observe that tax competition 
undermines the autonomy of countries2 and curtails national identity 
and democratic participation.3 These consequences seem to suggest 
that countries which suffer the most have the right against the negative 
impacts of tax competition. A question should immediately follow: 
who ought to bear the responsibility of fulfilling these rights? Although 
an intuitive answer might point to the countries that presently engage 
in tax competition, a deeper examination of the institutional history of 
the existing international tax regime and a broader look at the 
background conditions of the global economy might suggest otherwise. 
Any solution for curbing tax competition entails important 
consequences to all countries involved and generates winners and 
losers. Even if mitigating tax competition were to lead to collective 
benefits for most states, it would still create costs for others in the short 
run.4 A normative analysis of tax competition should not be limited to 
the ethics of tax competition in itself. It also needs to include a broader 
ethical examination of how the losses resulting from institutional 
reform should be distributed among countries. This Article analyzes 
this question by borrowing from a similar discussion in the context of 
climate change. Since a reduction in carbon emissions involves 
opportunity costs relating to economic development and growth, the 
prospects of a global solution to tackle anthropogenic climate change 
have generated a number of philosophical questions about how the 
burden of a solution should be shared among nations.5 
 
1. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1578–79 (2000). 
2. PETER DIETSCH, CATCHING CAPITAL: THE ETHICS OF TAX COMPETITION 46–54 
(2015). 
3. Tsilly Dagan, The Tragic Choices of Tax Policy in a Globalized Economy, in TAX, LAW 
AND DEVELOPMENT 57, 63 (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart eds., 2013). 
4. See Allison Christians, Spillovers and Tax Sovereignty, 85 TAX NOTES INT’L 831, 833 
(2017) (arguing that although all countries may stand to lose from tax competition, all countries 
may equally stand to lose from curbing tax competition, depending on how tax competition is 
defined and how it is to be regulated); Ilan Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global 
Justice Implications for International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 79 (2010) 
(noting that unlike the developed countries, which stand only to gain from effective tax 
coordination, developing countries may fear to enter such a cooperative scheme because the 
short-term costs may outweigh the long-term (speculative) benefits”). 
5. For a comprehensive collection of essays on the topic, see CLIMATE ETHICS: ESSENTIAL 
READINGS (Stephen Gardiner et al. eds., 2010). 
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Tax competition and climate change are similar in that they are 
both problems of collective action.6 In collective action problems, all 
parties would benefit from a solution, but the associated costs make it 
implausible that anyone would undertake it individually.7 The rational 
choice is to solve the problem cooperatively and share the costs.8 
Studies in climate change have extensively discussed the costs 
resulting from a collective solution, as well as criteria for an equitable 
distribution of these costs in a way that reflects the needs of developing 
countries in terms of poverty reduction and growth.9 In contrast, 
debates on tax competition rarely acknowledge explicitly that a 
collective solution for tax competition will create costs for some 
countries while favoring others.10 A look at the debates surrounding the 
efforts to mitigate climate change helps illustrate the different ethical 
perspectives on the burden sharing of curbing tax competition and 
 
6. See THOMAS RIXEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TAX 
GOVERNANCE 43–46 (2008) (analyzing tax competition as a collective action problem from a 
game-theoretical perspective). See also Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with 
Collective Action and Global Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550 (2010) 
(addressing climate change as a problem of global collective action and arguing that a 
combination of collective action theory and behavioral theory suggests approaches that might 
achieve a more effective solution). 
7. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 8 (1982). 
8. Robert E. Goodin, The Collective Action Problem, in FAIR RESOURCE ALLOCATION 
AND RATIONING AT THE BEDSIDE 224, 224 (Marion Danis et al. eds., 2014). 
9. Nicholas Stern, What is the Economics of Climate Change?, 7 WORLD ECON. 1, 6 
(2006). 
10. There are, however, notable exceptions. Peter Dietsch discusses a number of ethical 
questions arising from the implementation of a solution for tax competition. DIETSCH, supra 
note 2, at 188–218. Laurens Van Apeldoorn suggests that a solution for tax competition that 
disregards the different fiscal constraints faced by low-income and high-income countries will 
result in unequal (and unjust) levels of fiscal self-determination. See Laurens Van Apeldoorn, 
BEPS, Tax Sovereignty and Global Justice, CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 478, 487 
(2016). Allison Christians emphasizes that curbing tax competition is not a win-win scenario for 
all jurisdictions and argue for the need of a fair normative framework. Christians, supra note 4. 
Martin Hearson argues that reforming international tax rules in a way that realizes equity among 
countries requires not only tackling tax competition, but also looking at the distributional 
impacts of those rules. Martin Hearson, The Challenges for Developing Countries in 
International Tax Justice, J. DEV. STUD.1932, 1936 (2018). Tsilly Dagan argues that the shift 
from competition to negotiated coordination produces unjust inequalities that derive from 
asymmetries in the relative bargaining power of the negotiating states and suggests that 
restricting tax competition might produce severe distributive effects on poor countries. TSILLY 
DAGAN, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 142–84 
(2017). 
Interestingly, discussions on climate change seem to suffer from the opposite deficiency. 
It has been argued that there is too little focus on the economic advantages of tackling climate 
change. Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime Failure, 47 
NAT’L RESOURCES J. 195, 223 (2007). 
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offers possible alternatives for a fair distribution of costs resulting from 
institutional reform. 
Part II provides an overview of how the changes in the global 
economy resulting from globalization have intensified policy 
competition between governments. It then introduces the problem of 
international tax competition and describes some of its potential 
negative consequences. Part III points to particular implications for 
developing countries and discusses some of the challenges and 
constraints they face in the global economy. Part IV examines 
normative questions involving what I call the rights side of curbing tax 
competition and introduces some theoretical developments in the 
literature aimed at justifying the need to tackle tax competition. Part V 
analyzes the costs side of the problem and argues that a just solution 
for tax competition requires an equal concern with fairness in the 
upshot of institutional reform. It then describes how a similar problem 
has been discussed in the context of climate change and outlines four 
normative principles that could independently or jointly guide the 
burden sharing of curbing tax competition: the responsible party pays 
principle, the retrospective beneficiary pays principle, the prospective 
beneficiary pays principle, and the ability to pay principle. The Article 
concludes by suggesting that the complexity of tax competition might 
require a combination of principles rather than the sole application of 
one of them and offers recommendations for further research. 
II. GLOBALIZATION, THE COMPETITION STATE, AND 
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
A. From the Welfare State to the Competition State: Globalization 
and Tax Competition 
In recent decades, reduced costs of transportation and 
communication, combined with reduced policy barriers to trade and 
investment, have heavily facilitated cross-border investment.11 
Economic decisions are less and less constrained by national 
boundaries, as multinational corporations can easily shift capital and 
profits to any country where they operate.12 As a political phenomenon, 
 
11. Jeffrey Frankel, Globalization of the Economy, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 45, 45–46 (Joseph S. Nye Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000). 
12. DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX 76–77 (2011). 
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globalization translates as a shift in the playing field of politics from 
isolated units (the state) to a multilayered, complex arena.13 
Governments are pressed to adapt to an intricate economic and political 
environment of international institutions, multinational corporations, 
and cross-border flows of all kinds.14 To cope more effectively with the 
complex changes in institutional, cultural, and market structures, 
governments have reinvented themselves as quasi-market actors.15 
Since states cannot allow mobile capital to be driven away by the 
inadequate design of their institutions, government policies have 
shifted focus towards how domestic institutions influence the cross-
border transfer of economic activities.16 
Globalization puts countries under pressure to improve their 
attractiveness, since more competitive countries attract the influx of 
mobile factors—labor and capital—and leave other economies in a 
relatively inferior position, similar to competition between private 
firms.17 However, the political economy literature suggests that, 
contrary to market competition, competition between governments is 
likely to fail in two respects. First, because governments mostly 
undertake economic activities that cannot be handled satisfactorily by 
markets, competition between states is likely to replicate the market 
failures that justified government intervention in the first place.18 
Second, government competition imposes an important shift in the 
focus of governmental politics away from the general maximization of 
welfare within a nation—particularly redistributive transfer payments 
and social service provision—towards the promotion of enterprise and 
profitability.19 This shift tends to lead to what is known as a “race to 
 
13. See Philip G. Cerny, Paradoxes of the Competition State: The Dynamics of Political 
Globalization, 32 GOV’T OPPOSITION 251 (1997). See also DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 92 (1995) 
(“[T]he meaning of national decision-making institutions today has to be explored in the context 
of a complex international society, and a huge range of actual and nascent regional and global 
organizations which transcend and mediate national boundaries.”). 
14. KATE NASH, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY: GLOBALIZATION, POLITICS, 
AND POWER 44 (2d ed. 2010). 
15. Cerny, supra note 13, at 251. 
16. HANS-WERNER SINN, THE NEW SYSTEMS COMPETITION 4 (2003). 
17. Viktor Vanberg & Wolfgang Kerber, Institutional Competition among Jurisdictions: 
An Evolutionary Approach, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. 193, 204 (1994). 
18. Hans-Werner Sinn, The Selection Principle and Market Failure in Systems 
Competition, 66 J. PUB. ECON. 247, 248 (1997). 
19. Cerny, supra note 13, at 260. 
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the bottom,” that is, a downward convergence of policies and practices 
that preclude adequate protection of the social and economic well-
being of citizens, especially the poor.20 
This phenomenon is typically seen in international taxation.21 The 
increasing ease and volume of cross-border activity have shaped the 
international tax scene, as multinationals can choose among countries 
in which to locate investments and shop among potential host countries 
for the most attractive investment “package,” which includes the tax 
regime as one important element.22 Governments, in turn, aim their 
policies at attracting “both portfolio and direct investment by lowering 
their tax rates on income earned by foreigners.”23 On the one hand, 
nations have their tax revenues reduced by aggressive maneuvering of 
taxpayers and, on the other, each nation seeks to benefit by embracing 
behaviour, against other nations, intended to capture as much global 
capital as possible.24 
 
20. NITA RUDRA, GLOBALIZATION AND THE RACE TO THE BOTTOM IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: WHO REALLY GETS HURT? 3 (2008). Even some types of competition, such as 
strategic infrastructural investment, that might be considered beneficial because they tend to lead 
countries to a “race to the top” might be problematic in some cases for wasting more resources 
in local expenditures than would be reasonable or necessary. See DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 96–
97, 101–02; see also Leon Taylor, Infrastructural Competition among Jurisdictions, 49 J. PUB. 
ECON. 241 (1992) (observing that if competition is long and involves many contestants, it can 
produce net social loss, especially in the case of identical jurisdictions that compete by building 
infrastructure with no alternative value). 
21. Other forms of government competition include more relaxed rules for incorporation, 
banking regulations, environmental laws, and employment laws. 
22. Michael C. Durst, Poverty, Tax Competition, and Base Erosion, 89 TAX NOTES INT’L 
1189, 1194 (2018). See Philipp Genschel & Peter Schwarz, Tax Competition: A Literature 
Review, 9 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 339, 340–41 (2011) (explaining that, “for a long time, taxes were 
simply too low and cross-national tax differentials too small to trigger significant cross-border 
movements of taxpayers and bases,” which changed in the twentieth century with the increase 
of tax burdens and the erosion of mobility barriers). 
23. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1575–76. See also Dagan, supra note 3, at 58 
(“Competition provides taxpayers with an alternative: to shift either their capital, their residency, 
or even their citizenship, to another country. In the extreme case, tax competition changes 
taxation from the mandatory regime it used to be, to a regime that is basically elective, or more 
precisely, elective for some.”) 
24. Allison Christians, Putting the Reign Back in Sovereign, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1373, 1375 
(2013). See Tsilly Dagan, International Tax and Global Justice, 18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
1, 13–15 (2017) (“Competition increasingly is turning states into market players that offer their 
goods and services to potential ‘customers.’ In this market for sovereignty goods, states compete 
for capital and residents, while (at least some) individuals ‘shop around’ for sovereign-provided 
privileges, public goods, and social and cultural goods. . . .  [T]he tax policymaking process has 
gradually transformed under competition, and states increasingly operate as recruiters of mobile 
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Tax policy decision-making and the relationship between state 
and its subjects are then reversed. Rather than making compulsory 
demands from its residents to promote collective goals, as traditional 
tax policy would, governments increasingly act as “recruiters” of 
residents and investments from the global arena.25 Some see tax 
competition as a desirable process which creates locational efficiency26 
and produces gains for developing countries.27 However, many tax 
scholars suggest that, by turning countries into competitive players, it 
undermines the focus on setting tax regimes optimally to promote 
normative goals.28 
B. Negative Consequences of Tax Competition 
The effects of tax competition are not zero-sum. They reduce the 
collective revenue of countries as taxable income is moved from high-
tax to low- or no-tax jurisdictions, decreasing total tax payments.29 As 
taxes represent the principal means for governments to allocate 
resources, the decrease in tax revenues directly affects the ability of 
states to provide citizens with services and benefits.30 Tax scholars 
 
investments and residents from other states, while at the same time striving to retain their own 
residents and investments.”). 
25. Dagan, supra note 3, at 58. 
26. Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax 
Competition, (2001) 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 570 (arguing that the harms of tax competition commonly 
associated with the disruption of the redistributive process have been exaggerated in several 
respects). 
27. Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 411, 
445–48 (“[T]he shifted investment, although producing less tax revenue than in its original 
country, might nonetheless produce private benefits for its new host country—in forms such as 
wages, training, and technology transfer. . . . [T]here is no obvious reason to suppose that any 
undermining of tax equity in developed countries represents a loss greater than the gain made 
by developing countries.”). 
28. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 1; Dagan, supra note 3, at 63; DIETSCH, supra note 
2. 
29. INT’L MONETARY FUND, SPILLOVERS IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE TAXATION 14 
(2014). In terms of macroeconomic policy, one country’s domestic tax decisions may affect 
other countries’ policies in different ways: by affecting growth and macroeconomic stability, 
due to the impacts of shift of real (foreign direct investments) and financial flows (corporate 
financing arrangements); by constraining the corporate tax base, as the reflection of changes in 
multinationals’ investments decisions; by creating pressure to reduce tax rates, in response to 
lower tax rates abroad; and by modifying world prices, as tax policies affect investment and 
saving behavior, changing interest rates and wages around the globe. Id. at 12–13. 
30. The tax literature has noted that the negative effects of tax competition on different 
countries vary significantly depending on country size, level of development, and level of 
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observe that countries have responded in two ways to tax competition. 
First, by shifting the tax burden from more mobile economic factors 
(such as business profits and capital income) to less mobile ones 
(mainly, wages and consumption),31 and second, when the increase of 
taxation of labor has become politically and economically problematic, 
by reducing the social safety net.32 
This means that tax competition can negatively affect tax equity 
in three different dimensions.33 First, as the ability for relocating 
income facilitated by tax competition is mostly enjoyed by the rich, tax 
competition might hinder vertical equity, which requires that 
individuals with unequal incomes should be taxed differently, 
according to their abilities to pay.34 As higher-income taxpayers 
contribute less to the tax burden than those with lower income, the 
burden tends to shift to the poor.35 Moreover, since the tax and transfer 
system is traditionally conceived as the most powerful policy 
instrument for income redistribution,36 tax competition can also impose 
adverse effects on vertical equity taken as a broader notion of 
distributing goods among residents according to their needs and 
capabilities, as it might reduce countries’ tax revenues to concerning 
levels. Second, as the tax burden shifts from capital to labor, taxpayers 
with the same level of income, one from capital and the other from 
 
domestic institutional constraints. See Genschel & Schwarz, supra note 22, at 341–42; DIETSCH, 
supra note 2, at 55–61. 
31. Alex Easson, Fiscal Degradation and the Inter-Nation Allocation of Tax Jurisdiction, 
3 EC TAX REV. 112, 112 (1996); Diane Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: 
The Role of Tax Sovereignty in Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 555, 576 (2009); 
Allison Christians, How Nations Share, 87 INDIANA L.J. 1407, 1408 (2012); Thomas Rixen, Tax 
Competition and Inequality: The Case for Global Tax Governance, 17 GLOB. GOV. 447, 452 
(2011). For a more detailed explanation, suggesting three distinct categories of taxpayers (the 
relatively “easy-to-tax,” the relatively “hard-to-tax,” and the virtually “impossible-to-tax”), see 
Allison Christians, Drawing the Boundaries of Tax Justice, in THE QUEST FOR TAX REFORM 
CONTINUES: THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON TAXATION FIFTY YEARS LATER 53, 72–76 (Kim 
Brooks ed., 2013). 
32. Avi-Yonah, supra note 1, at 1576. 
33. Laura Seelkopf & Hanna Lierse, Taxation and Inequality: How Tax Competition Has 
Changed the Redistributive Capacity of Nation-States in the OECD, in WELFARE STATE 
TRANSFORMATIONS AND INEQUALITY IN OECD COUNTRIES 89, 92–93 (Melike Wulfgramm, 
Tonia Bieber & Stephan Leibfried eds., 2016).  
34. Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1200 (2008). 
35. Seelkopf & Lierse, supra note 33. 
36. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A STUDY IN PUBLIC 
ECONOMY 18 (1959).  
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labor, are taxed differently.37 This affects horizontal equity, according 
to which the same income should be taxed at the same rate, 
independently of its source.38 Third, as countries have different sets of 
advantages and disadvantages in competing for capital and income, tax 
competition changes the income distribution not only within but also 
between countries involved. Because tax competition affects countries 
differently, it might worsen international inequality, precluding inter-
nation equity—i.e., equity between countries.39 
It has also been argued that tax competition undermines the 
autonomy of countries regarding the size of the public budget and the 
desired level of redistribution.40 A country’s taxing choices (what, 
who, and how much to tax) is classically based on political factors such 
as fairness and distribution of political power. Tax policy choices, 
however, depend not only on what the country wants to tax but also on 
what it can tax.41 As tax competition pushes countries to lower their 
tax rates, it limits their fiscal policy choices and might curtail national 
identity and democratic self-determination.42 
The risk of a “race to the bottom” in the tax competition scenario 
is evident. As investors can freely choose where to invest in the world, 
they choose the country with the most favorable tax regime. 
Governments, in turn, have the incentive to attract foreign capital by 
undercutting each other’s tax rates. This race leads to mobile incomes 
being taxed less or not at all43 and, some argue, results in the under-
provision of public goods.44 In terms of justice, tax competition tends 
 
37. Seelkopf & Lierse, supra note 33. 
38. Infanti, supra note 34. 
39. For an overview of the definition and importance of the concept of inter-nation equity, 
see Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 L. & POL’Y INT’L 
BUS. 145 (1998); Jinyan Li, Improving Inter-Nation Equity Through Territorial Taxation and 
Tax Sparing, in GLOBALIZATION AND ITS TAX DISCONTENTS: TAX POLICY AND 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 117 (Arthur J. Cockfield ed., 2010).  
40. DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 46–54. But see David C. Elkins, The Merits of Tax 
Competition in a Globalized Economy, 91 INDIANA L.J. 905 (2016); Mitchell B. Weiss, 
International Tax Competition: An Efficient or Inefficient Phenomenon?, 16 AKRON TAX J. 99 
(2001); Roin, supra note 26; Littlewood, supra note 27. 
41. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Tax Policy in Emerging Countries, 26 ENV’T & 
PLANNING C: GOV’T & POL’Y 73, 75 (2008). 
42. Dagan, supra note 3, at 63. 
43. Seelkopf & Lierse, supra note 33, at 95.  
44. See George R. Zodrow & Peter Mieszkowski, Pigou, Tiebout, Property Taxation, and 
the Underprovision of Local Public Goods, 19 J. URB. ECON. 356 (1986). For an overview of 
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to undermine the ability of states to maintain the necessary conditions 
for promoting justice and for providing their constituents with the 
assurances required for social cooperation.45 
III. IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
Compared to the developed world, developing countries face 
more significant tax policy constraints in an increasingly globalized 
world. Due to weak revenue administrative capacity, they have great 
difficulty in collecting enough tax revenues to support the desired level 
of expenditures.46 Moreover, the average cost of collecting taxes in the 
developing world is substantially higher than in developed countries.47 
In this respect, commentators suggest that three potential constraints 
hinder the ability of developing countries to improve their tax 
administrations: the availability of funds, the domestic political will, 
and the speed with which capability can be built.48 Developing 
countries with weak administrations also face major challenges from 
international outflows of capital and profits, as in many cases they are 
simply “unaware of the revenue they are losing.”49 
Inefficient tax administrations create additional difficulties for 
developing economies. First, the inability to effectively collect income 
tax hinders the tax and transfer system that support lower-income 
populations.50 Second, taxpayer compliance costs (i.e., costs incurred 
by taxpayers to comply with tax regulations) in developing countries is 
often high compared to the developed world. Research suggests the 
average compliance costs in developing countries are four to five times 
higher than in developed countries,51 discouraging investment and 
 
the baseline model of tax competition and some variations, see also Genschel & Schwarz, supra 
note 22.  
45. Dagan supra note 24, at 4. 
46. See Bird & Zolt, supra note 41, at 76 (explaining that, in principle, revenues should 
grow at the same rate as desired expenditures, but that emerging and developing countries hardly 
achieve this target, which leads to frequent tax reforms aimed primarily at closing short-term 
revenue gaps).  
47. Id.  
48. See, e.g., Michael Carnahan, Taxation Challenges in Developing Countries, 2 ASIA 
PACIFIC POL’Y STUD. 169, 180 (2015).  
49. Id. at 179. 
50. Bird & Zolt, supra note 41, at 80 n.12. 
51. See Roy W. Bahl & Richard M. Bird, Tax Policy in Developing Countries: Looking 
Back—and Forward, 61 NAT’L TAX J. 279, 291 (2008). See also INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
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impeding productivity and competitiveness.52 Third, tax revenues in 
developing countries are quite low compared to the developed world. 
While the average tax revenue to GDP ratio in developed countries is 
approximately 35%, tax revenue in developing countries is 
approximately 15% of GDP, and in the poorest of these countries it is 
about 12%.53 
An important factor affecting developing countries’ tax systems 
is the substantial size of the informal economy. The literature suggests 
that the tax regime in developing economies can be split in two 
systems: one has relatively high tax-compliance rates and comprises 
medium and large corporations, which are subject to strict reporting 
requirements and keep relatively accurate records; the other is 
comprised of many small enterprises operating in great part in the 
informal sector, with low compliance rates.54 Efforts to bring this 
sector into compliance are difficult and expensive.55 Besides, a large 
informal sector makes it almost impossible to tax income consistently, 
which is problematic from an equity point of view. Furthermore, the 
elasticity of taxable income relative to the level of taxes is high, which 
means that when the government of a country with a large informal 
sector tries to raise taxes, the taxable income reported drops 
substantially.56 
Another important challenge for developing countries is that the 
present international tax regime was designed in a way that favors 
richer nations. Today, most of bilateral tax treaties follow the OECD 
Model Tax Convention, which allocates more taxing rights in favour 
 
REVENUE MOBILIZATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 21 (2011) (suggesting more modestly 
that while a typical firm spend 210 hours preparing and paying taxes in high-income countries, 
the time spent by firms in developing countries exceeds 300 hours). 
52. Empirical research on tax compliance cost also shows significant regressivity in tax 
compliance costs in the developing world. Jacqueline Coolidge, Findings of Tax Compliance 
Cost Surveys in Developing Countries, 10 EJOURNAL TAX RES. 250, 256 (2012). 
53. CLEMENS FUEST & NADINE RIEDEL, TAX EVASION, TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX 
EXPENDITURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 1 (2009), 
http://www.sbs.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Business_Taxation/Docs/Publications/Reports/TaxE
vasionReportDFIDFINAL1906.pdf (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
54. Bird & Zolt, supra note 41, at 80. 
55. Id. 
56. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?, 28 
J. ECON. PERSP. 99, 110 (2014). See also Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud De Mooij & Michael Keen, 
Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing Countries 23 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 15/118, 2015). 
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of capital-exporting countries (mostly, developed countries), at the 
expense of capital-importing countries (mostly, developing 
countries).57 
Tax policy choices in many developing countries have also been 
limited by their reliance on foreign trade and investment and by the 
constraints imposed by outsiders, such as international lenders and 
major trading partners.58 One important example is tax conditionalities 
required by international financial institutions to provide needed 
financial and technical support. Commentators argue that tax 
conditionalities imposed by the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) 
ignore domestic equity concerns by focusing solely on economic 
efficiency and administrative efficacy, and that the secretive and 
expert-driven process of tax conditionality is conducted by the IMF 
staff directly with a government or technical “elite,” whose goals and 
values may differ from those of the country’s population.59 
Aside from these general tax policy constraints to developing 
countries, tax competition poses additional challenges to the world’s 
poorest countries for three main reasons.60 First, economists have long 
observed the dependence of developing economies on corporate 
income tax revenues as a share of all revenues. While in developed 
countries personal income tax revenues are often three to four times the 
corporate income tax revenues, in developing countries personal 
 
57. Hearson, supra note 10, at 1936; KEVIN HOLMES, INTERNATIONAL TAX POLICY AND 
DOUBLE TAX TREATIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION 62–63 (2d ed. 
2014). For a broader critical analysis of the contemporary structures of global tax governance, 
see Tarcisio Diniz Magalhães, What Is Really Wrong with Global Tax Governance and How to 
Properly Fix It, 10 WORLD TAX J. (forthcoming 2018). 
58. See Allison Christians, Global Trends and Constraints on Tax Policy in the Least 
Developed Countries, 42 U.B.C. L. REV. 239, 274 (2010) (“Decisions made by and for the 
developed world about how to foster and encourage globalization through international tax 
policy limit the range of tax policy strategies available to the world’s least developed countries.”) 
59. See Miranda Stewart & Sunita Jogarajan, The International Monetary Fund and Tax 
Reform, 2 BRIT. TAX REV. 146, 162-63 (2004). See also Christians, supra note 58, at 263 
(observing that institutional assistance is available only to support tax policy strategies that are 
favored by the international community of finance experts); Richard M. Bird, Foreign Advice 
and Tax Policy in Developing Countries 15 (Int’l Ctr. for Public Policy, Working Paper No. 13-
07, 2013), https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=icepp 
[https://perma.cc/MHC8-A2WW] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018) (suggesting that, at least to some 
extent, such tax policies were accepted because they coincided with elite interests). 
60. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 29, at 7. 
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income tax revenues are often lower than corporate income revenues.61 
Revenues from personal income tax in developing countries amount to 
only one to two percent of gross domestic product (“GDP”), compared 
with nine to eleven percent in developed countries.62 As tax 
competition is primarily driven by corporate tax cuts, fiscal 
performance in developing countries is significantly more vulnerable 
to pressures from tax competition.63 Studies suggest that developing 
countries might lose from tax competition three times as much as they 
receive in development aid.64 
Second, developing countries are also more vulnerable to tax 
competition because of tax-sensitivity of firms. Some studies indicate 
that multinationals’ investment and profit levels in developing 
countries are more sensitive to taxation than in the developed world, 
making them more vulnerable to increasing capital mobility.65 Indeed, 
while the global decrease of corporate tax rates has not significantly 
affected corporate tax revenues in developed countries(both as a share 
of GDP and as a share of total tax revenues), it has considerably 
reduced corporate tax revenues in some of the poorest and most 
vulnerable of the developing countries.66 Third, in the tax competition 
scenario, some types of tax incentives are likely to be more successful 
than others in attracting investments and generating benefits for the 
host country.67 Since designing effective tax incentives is already a 
challenge for well-resourced tax administrations in developed 
countries, the likelihood for serious revenue leakages and negative 
consequences in developing countries is much greater.68 
 
61. Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of the 
Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries 52 UCLA L. REV. 1627, 1656 (2005). 
62. Carnahan, supra note 48, at 176. 
63. Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization and Tax Competition: Implications for Developing 
Countries, 44 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 60, 63 (2001). 
64. See DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 192. 
65. FUEST & RIEDEL, supra note 53, at 40, 43. 
66. Michael Keen & Alejandro Simone, Is Tax Competition Harming Developing 
Countries More Than Developed?, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 1317 (2004). 
67. Carnahan, supra note 48, at 177. 
68. Id. 
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IV. THE RIGHTS SIDE OF CURBING TAX COMPETITION: 
FAIRNESS IN FISCAL SELF-DETERMINATION 
As mentioned in Section II.B, tax competition tends to result in 
more regressive national tax systems, decreased capacity for 
redistribution of wealth, and reduced ability of the world’s poorest 
countries to pursue sustainable development. This has led tax scholars 
to question whether limits should be imposed on the sovereignty of 
countries in designing domestic policies that, although beneficial for 
their constituents, may impose harms and constraints on other 
countries.69 As tax competition undermines the autonomy of countries 
in determining their fiscal policies (i.e., in establishing their desired 
level of taxation and redistribution), it has been noted that governments 
must give up some of their de jure sovereignty (the legal right to design 
their tax systems) through cooperation if they want to retain de facto 
sovereignty (i.e., their ability to achieve policy goals).70 
Contemporary conceptions of sovereignty suggest that it 
comprises two related ideas, one of autonomy and another of duty.71 
The right of a state to make autonomous choices (its sovereign 
 
69. See generally Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation and Social Contract, 18 MINN. 
J. INT’L L. 99 (2009); Ring, supra note 31; Peter Dietsch, Rethinking Sovereignty in 
International Fiscal Policy, 37 REV. INT’L STUD. 2107, 2117 (2011). 
70. See Rixen, supra note 31, at 448. See also Easson, supra note 31, at 112 (explaining 
that the apparent defense of national fiscal sovereignty has brought about a real loss of 
sovereignty by virtue of tax erosion and that states cannot protect their tax bases without 
cooperation); Diane M. Ring, What’s at Stake in the Sovereignty Debate?: International Tax 
and the Nation-State, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 155, 233 (2008) (suggesting that cooperation itself may 
be the key to preserving sovereignty); Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative 
Standard in U.S. Tax Policy, 60 TAX L. REV. 155, 178 (2007) (arguing that cooperation with 
other countries rather than following beggar-your-neighbor strategies should make all countries 
better off if adherence to the agreed norms is sufficiently reciprocal); Li, supra note 39, at 129 
(suggesting that in the age of globalization many international problems can only be addressed 
effectively by international cooperation). From a broader perspective, not limited to taxation, 
see, e.g., Miriam Ronzoni, Two Conceptions of State Sovereignty and Their Implications for 
Global Institutional Design, 15 CRIT. REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 573 (2012) (arguing that, 
in certain circumstances, only the establishment of supranational institutions with some 
sovereign powers can allow states to exercise sovereignty in a meaningful way and suggesting 
that tax competition is one of these circumstances); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, POWER AND 
GOVERNANCE IN A PARTIALLY GLOBALIZED WORLD 204 (2002) (“If world government is 
unfeasible and laissez-faire a recipe for a backlash, we need to search for an intermediate 
solution: a set of practices for governance that improve coordination and create safety valves for 
political and social pressures, consistent with the maintenance of nation-states as the 
fundamental form of political organization.”) 
71. See Christians, supra note 69. 
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autonomy), as happens with any other kind of right, is constrained by 
the rights of others to make their own autonomous choices. The right 
to sovereignty of a state conceptually implies the notion of a duty to 
respect the similar right of other states (sovereign duty).72 
Contemporary conceptions of sovereignty seem to suggest a shift from 
a notion of absolute autonomy towards an idea of restraint.73 
Sovereignty is redefined as responsibility, both in the state’s internal 
functions (responsibility towards citizens) and in international relations 
(responsibility towards fellow nations).74 
This new conception of sovereignty implies ethical constraints to 
the autonomy of states in designing their domestic tax policies. Recent 
developments in the political philosophy literature on tax competition 
suggest that strategic fiscal policy decisions that produce negative 
impacts on the fiscal autonomy of other states are ethically 
unacceptable.75 This means that although countries are ethically 
allowed to compete, competitive policies that produce a collectively 
suboptimal outcome should be condemned from an ethical 
perspective.76 Moreover, it has been noted that the fact that tax 
competition has a deeper impact upon developing economies brings 
 
72. See Id. at 101 (suggesting the term “sovereign duty” to express the duty of a state to 
respect the sovereign right of other states to tax). 
73. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the 
Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013). From the 
perspective of tax sovereignty, see Christians, supra note 69, at 99 (“But this view of sovereign 
autonomy over taxation is increasingly inconsistent with a global economic reality in which 
market and regulatory relationships have been and are being fundamentally reformulated.”) 
74. Dietsch, supra note 69, at 2112–14. 
75. DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 80. In his book, Dietsch develops a comprehensive 
normative framework for tax competition. He proposes two principles of global tax justice: the 
membership principle and the fiscal policy constraint. According to the membership principle, 
individuals and corporations are liable to pay tax in the state of which they are a member, i.e., 
one cannot enjoy public services of one country and “choose” to pay taxes to another. According 
to the fiscal policy constraint principle, a fiscal policy undertaken by a state is unjust if it is both 
strategically motivated (to attracting foreign corporations) and has a negative impact on the 
aggregate fiscal self-determination of other states. See id. In contrast, Laurens Van Apeldoorn 
criticizes Dietsch’s conception of fiscal self-determination and argues that an adequate concept 
should consider the existing policy constraints of low-income countries rather than assume that, 
eliminated tax competition, the levels of fiscal self-determination of high- and low-income 
countries would be the same (what he terms the “equality interpretation”) or at least satisfy a 
minimum baseline (what he calls the “baseline interpretation”). See Van Apeldoorn, supra note 
10, at 484-89. 
76. DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 97–102. 
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about additional normative concerns.77 In this respect, a human rights 
analysis might suggest that tax competition should be mitigated as it 
tends to undermine the opportunities of the disadvantaged around the 
world.78 
Commentators have proposed different solutions for curbing tax 
competition.79 The OECD has been leading efforts to achieve 
international cooperation to address tax competition.80 In 1998, the 
OECD issued a report entitled Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging 
Global Issue,81 which established criteria for what the OECD regards 
as harmful tax competition and recommended counteractive 
measures.82 In 2013, the OECD initiated a more comprehensive project 
aimed at tackling different forms of tax avoidance, now commonly 
known as the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project.83 This 
ongoing initiative proposes different measures to address tax base 
erosion by adopting a collaborative-based rather than a competition-
based paradigm.84 One of its sections (Action 5) is specifically aimed 
at tackling tax competition.85 As a continuation of OECD’s 1998 
initiative, it condemns countries’ tax regimes that are “designed in a 
way that allows taxpayers to derive benefits from the regime while 
 
77. Miriam Ronzoni, Global Tax Governance: The Bullets Internationalists Must Bite – 
And Those They Must Not, 1 J. MORAL PHIL. & POL. 37, 43 (2014). 
78. Allison Christians, Fair Taxation as a Basic Human Right, 9 INT’L REV. CONST. 211, 
228 (2009). 
79. An analysis of these proposals would be beyond the scope of this Article. For an 
overview of the most prominent proposals, see Sol Picciotto, Unitary Alternatives and 
Formulary Appointment, in TAXING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AS UNITARY FIRMS 27 (Sol 
Picciotto ed., 2017). 
80. See Allison Christians, Taxation in a Time of Crisis: Policy Leadership from the 
OECD to the G20, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 19, 20 (2010) (pointing out that the OECD has long 
enjoyed a position of central importance in formulating and disseminating international tax 
policy norms). 
81. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE (1998). For a 
comprehensive and critical analysis of the OECD’s harmful tax practices initiative, see 
Christians, supra note 69. 
82. In the same year, the European Union (“EU”) published a code of conduct for business 
taxation, which, similar to the OECD’s report, aimed at curbing what it considered harmful tax 
competition. For more details on the EU’s code of conduct and on the OECD’s report, see 
Michael Keen, Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful, 54 NAT’L TAX 
J. 757 (2001). 
83. OECD, ADDRESSING BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING (2013). 
84. Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 58 (2014). 
85. See OECD, ACTION PLAN ON BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING 18 (2013). 
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engaging in operations that are purely tax-driven and involve no 
substantial activities.”86 
V. THE COSTS SIDE OF CURBING TAX COMPETITION: 
FAIRNESS IN SHARING THE BURDEN 
A. The Costs of Curbing Tax Competition 
The literature on the ethics of tax competition often focuses on 
what I am labeling “the rights side” of the problem, that is, on the 
ethical reasons for curbing tax competition. However, there is little 
discussion on what I term “the costs side” of addressing tax 
competition, i.e., on how to share the burden of mitigating tax 
competition.87 Any potential solution for tax competition entails 
important consequences to all countries involved, from states that 
strategically engage in competitive behavior to others that participate 
only defensively, from the poorest to the richest nations in the globe. 
Any global institutional change aimed at tackling tax competition will 
result in winners and losers. Restricting tax competition will affect 
multinationals’ decisions about where to locate their economic 
activities. Investment location decisions will be determined by other 
competitive factors, such as natural resources, infrastructure, and 
regulatory framework.88 
As problematic as it may be for countries to pursue strategic 
policies that negatively affect other nations, one may argue that simply 
 
86. OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO 
ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5: 2015 FINAL REPORT 23 (2015). See 
Allison Christians, BEPS and the New International Tax Order, 6 BYU L. REV. 1603, 1631 
(2016) (pointing out the shift in the OECD’s approach from the 1998 initiative to the BEPS 
project and explaining that the latter focuses on identifying unacceptable country tax practices 
rather than singling out countries themselves, after criticism over the previous initiative, which 
appeared to focus on small, non-OECD countries while overlooking the contributions of its own 
members to the overall phenomenon of harmful tax competition). 
87. But see DIETSCH, supra note 2. In a chapter entitled “Life with (or after) tax 
competition,” Dietsch discusses some ethical questions that arise from the implementation of 
institutional reform that address tax competition, regarding them as matters of transitonal justice. 
See also DAGAN, supra note 10, at 120–212 (pointing to the inefficiencies and potentially 
regressive effects among and within states arising from multilateral tax cooperation).  
88. In this respect, it may be argued that even if curbing tax competition could result in 
greater tax revenues for all economies, some countries might be better off with the domestic 
benefits of attracting foreign investments through lower tax rates, as they may have more 
pressing needs than maintaining a social welfare net. DAGAN, supra note 10, at 133. 
2018] TAX COMPETITION 79 
putting an end to tax competition would be to correct one injustice—
tax competition—with another—creating global institutions that are 
likely to be biased in favor of the most powerful and rich countries.89 
Indeed, some of the low-tax countries—which would arguably be the 
biggest losers of institutional reform—are small economies that heavily 
rely on the current international regime.90 An example is the small 
island economies that, characterized by profound economic 
disadvantages, have specialized in hosting offshore finance centres.91 
The literature points out that international organizations have often 
encouraged these small, resource-poor countries to embrace tax-haven 
strategies as a means for accelerating development,92 ignoring the 
“crowding out” effect of the booming sector that would lead to a 
situation of overdependence.93 Institutional reform would cause a 
relevant impact on these countries, on their financial sectors but also 
on other sectors of their economy—tourism, agriculture, 
manufacturing—which were crowded out by the financial industry.94 
Whether or not it is true that mitigating tax competition might be 
collectively better for all states in the long run,95 it is undeniable that it 
will create costs for some countries while favoring others.96 Discussing 
 
89. See DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 202. See also DAGAN, supra note 10, at 142–212; 
Littlewood, supra note 27, at 414 n.3 (“The extent to which the tax avoidance industry benefits 
the residents of havens generally (as distinct from merely benefiting those who work in that 
industry) is debatable, but it seems reasonable to assume that there is generally some benefit.”). 
90. Gillian Brock, Taxation and Global Justice: Closing the Gap between Theory and 
Practice, 39 J. SOC. PHIL. 161, 168 (2008). 
91. Mark P. Hampton & John Christensen, Offshore Pariahs? Small Island Economies, 
Tax Havens, and the Re-Configuration of Global Finance, 30 WORLD DEV. 1657, 1657 (2002). 
92. Philipp Genschel & Laura Seelkopf, Winners and Losers of Tax Competition, in 
GLOBAL TAX GOVERNANCE: WHAT IS WRONG WITH IT AND HOW TO FIX IT 55, 69 (Peter 
Dietsch & Thomas Rixen eds., 2016). 
93.  Hampton & Christensen, supra note 91, at 1664 (“The assertion ran that wealthy 
tourists would visit the islands, enjoy the lifestyle, and subsequently establish residence and 
invest. At the same time bankers and tax accountants would be attracted by the climate and 
lifestyle and would bring with them their knowledge and experience, adding to the virtuous 
circle. How could such a favorable situation for a small economy go wrong?”) 
94. DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 211. 
95. While some commentators argue that global tax competition produces unfairness by 
reducing global tax revenues, others contend that it is rather a desirable process that creates 
locational efficiency. See generally Elkins, supra note 40; Weiss, supra note 40. See also Roin, 
supra note 26. Moreover, some suggest that tax competition might be beneficial as they produce 
gains for developing economies. Littlewood, supra note 27. 
96. See Christians, supra note 4, at 833 (arguing that although all countries may stand to 
lose from tax competition, all countries may equally stand to lose from curbing tax competition, 
depending on how “tax competition” is defined and how it is to be regulated). 
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international policies to tackle tax competition should not be limited to 
the ethics of tax competition in itself but should include a broader 
ethical examination of how the losses resulting from institutional 
reform should be distributed among countries. Since every change in 
international policy will positively affect some actors and negatively 
impact on others, one question needs to be asked: how should the 
burden of an institutional change be shared? Before addressing this 
issue, I suggest that observing how a similar problem is treated in 
another context might illuminate our discussion on tax competition. 
This will be done in Subsection V.B. 
B. The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility  
The problem just described resembles the discussion on climate 
change. That anthropogenic climate change should be mitigated is 
almost undisputed in the scientific literature.97 The United Nations 
Convention on Climate Change,98 drafted in 1992 at the UN 
Conference on Development and Environment, was signed by 197 
parties to date99 and demonstrates that there is a global consensus on 
the issue. Similarly, the 2015 Paris Agreement affirms the commitment 
to a two degrees limit target.100 However, despite acknowledging that 
emissions reductions are necessary, states recognized that such a 
solution would result in opportunity costs relating to economic 
development and growth.101 In the discussions on how to address 
climate change, states realized that, for reasons of justice and political 
feasibility, they would need to think of how to distribute the global 
responsibility to cap total global greenhouse gas emissions among 
countries.102 
At the 2015 Paris Climate Conference, China and India argued for 
differentiated responsibilities among richer and poorer countries 
 
97. See John Cook et al., Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming 
in the Scientific Literature, 8 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2013). 
98. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S 107.  
99. U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, Status of Ratification of the Convention, 
https://unfccc.int/process/the-convention/what-is-the-convention/status-of-ratification-of-the-
convention [https://perma.cc/5NXS-9TDB] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
100. See The Paris Agreement, Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris 
Agreement]. 
101. KOK-CHOR TAN, WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED GLOBAL JUSTICE? 120 (2017). 
102. Darrel Moellendorf, Treaty Norms and Climate Change Mitigation, 23 ETHICS & 
INT’L AFF. 247, 251 (2009). 
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considering their different capabilities.103 Acknowledging this demand, 
the Paris Agreement provided that a solution for climate change should 
“recogniz[e] the specific needs and special circumstances of 
developing country Parties”104 and that it should be implemented “to 
reflect equity and the principle of common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different 
national circumstances.”105 The agreed principle is now broadly known 
as the Common but Differentiated Responsibility (“CBDR”) principle 
and stands in contrast to the idea that the burden of climate justice 
should be shared equally by all societies regardless of background 
conditions.106 
Political philosophers and commentators have suggested that 
richer nations should bear more costs than developing countries in 
addressing climate change based on different moral grounds. For 
simplicity, I will limit the arguments to the two most common grounds: 
1) historical responsibility for benefits and damages brought forth by 
past emissions; 2) ability to pay.107 
The argument based on historical responsibility comprises two 
similar but distinct versions.108 One is the polluter pays principle, 
which ascribes responsibility to the historical polluter.109 It builds on 
the intuitive notion that one should take responsibility for their actions. 
The polluter pays principle is defended by commentators both on fault 
and no-fault grounds (strict liability).110 The second version is called 
 
103. Key Points of the Paris Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/climate/2015-paris-climate-talks. 
104. Paris Agreement, supra note 100, at 1. 
105. Id. at 3. 
106. TAN, supra note 101, at 121. 
107. See Derek Bell, Global Climate Justice, Historic Emissions, and Excusable 
Ignorance, 94 MONIST 391, 391 (2011) (pointing out that the expression Common but 
Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities itself suggests a “hybrid” principle, 
according to which all states bear a common responsibility for protecting climate-related rights 
and that how much each state should pay depends on both their historical emissions 
(“differentiated responsibilities”) and their ability to pay (“respective capabilities”)). 
108. A more detailed classification can be found in Lukas H. Meyer & Dominic Roser, 
Climate Justice and Historical Emissions, 13 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. POLIT. PHIL. 229 
(2010), where the authors subdivide what I here present as the polluter pays principle in two: the 
emitter pays principle (based on individual responsibility) and the community pays principle 
(based on collective responsibility). I here conflate both categories for simplification. 
109. TAN, supra note 101, at 124. 
110. For a detailed analysis, see DARREL MOELLENDORF, THE MORAL CHALLENGE OF 
DANGEROUS CLIMATE CHANGE 165–69 (2014). 
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the beneficiary pays principle and identifies the beneficiary of 
emissions as responsible.111 It is based on the idea that if the current 
inhabitants of industrialized countries have benefited from emissions 
so that their standard of living today is higher than it would otherwise 
have been, they must pay a cost for that.112 
Arguments built on historical responsibility, especially in the case 
of the polluter pays principle, require justifying why the wrongs 
committed by individuals in the past should fall on persons in the 
present.113 One possible solution to the problem of intergenerational 
justice is to adopt a collectivist approach to moral responsibility.114 
Such a solution, however, requires answering some deeper questions 
about justice and moral agency.115 The beneficiary pays principle faces 
similar problems. It requires answering whether present actors should 
pay if it was only their ancestors who benefited the most.116 It also 
involves the issue of identification and measurement. Who are the 
beneficiaries?117 How should one measure the benefits?118 
 
111. TAN, supra note 101, at 127–28. 
112. Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change, 18 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 747, 757 (2005). 
113. See MOELLENDORF, supra note 110, at 173–74. 
114. See Caney, supra note 112, at 774. 
115. TAN, supra note 101, at 126 (“The collectivist turn is a promising solution to the 
problem of reparations for past international injustice. But its full defense will require some 
deeper understanding of what makes for a collective moral agent and how a collective 
responsibility can be distributed among individuals of the collective. What are some of the 
necessary conditions for collective moral agency? Must the collective show some structured 
deliberative capacity? Must it be a collective whose individuals share national ties or other bonds 
of solidarity? Or must the individuals of the collective be enjoined via certain common interests? 
And if there is indeed a collective responsibility, what is the right way of parceling this 
responsibility out among individuals?”). 
116. See generally Simon Caney, Climate Change and the Duties of the Advantaged, 13 
CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. POL. PHIL. 203 (2010). 
117. See, e.g., Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, 75 INT’L 
AFF. 531, 534-35 (1999) (pointing out that “[q]uite a bit of breath and ink has been spent in 
arguments over how much [less developed countries] have benefited from the technologies and 
other advances made by the [developed countries], compared to the benefits enjoyed by the 
[developed countries] themselves.”). 
118. See TAN, supra note 101, at 128 (“For instance, is a country benefitting from such 
activities if it gains economically but loses out in terms of breathable air and clean environment 
for its citizens? Moreover, how direct must the benefits from emission production be in order to 
count as a relevant benefit?  . . .  And finally, what difference does it make, if any, if the benefits 
acquired were not sought out or voluntarily accepted, but simply thrust upon an agent? If the 
present generation benefits from the actions of their predecessors without asking for them – 
indeed they can’t avoid the benefits – can it be fairly held to account?”). 
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The other moral ground for differentiated responsibilities is the 
ability to pay principle, which focuses on the different capabilities of 
countries to address climate change.119 It may be argued that the ability 
to pay principle is so fundamental that it is difficult to justify it by 
deriving it from considerations that are more fundamental still.120 One 
possible moral justification can be found in John Rawls’s difference 
principle, one of the most important principles of justice in modern 
political philosophy.121 The difference principle states that the 
advantages of the better situated are just only if they are part of an 
institutional setting that improves the expectations of the least 
advantaged members of society so that existing inequalities must 
contribute effectively to the benefit of the least advantaged.122 
The ability to pay principle applied to the problem of climate 
change requires that transition costs be incorporated into reform design. 
It suggests that, although necessary to mitigate climate change, this 
transition should not slow human development and the eradication of 
poverty in the least developed countries.123 This principle does face 
important challenges. The idea that principles of distributive justice—
which traditionally apply to relations between individuals within one 
jurisdiction— should apply at the international level has been strongly 
argued by cosmopolitans124 but has faced equally vigorous opposition 
from anti-globalists.125 
 
119. See Caney, supra note 116. 
120. Shue, supra note 117, at 537. 
121. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 65–70 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) 
(1971); see also JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 61–66 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001). 
122. See supra note 121. 
123. MOELLENDORF, supra note 110, at 175. 
124. For early developments of cosmopolitanism, see CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL 
THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1999); see generally THOMAS POGGE, WORLD 
POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILITIES AND REFORMS (2nd ed. 
2008). 
125. See, e.g., Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 113 
(2005); Michael Blake, Distributive Justice, State Coercion, and Autonomy, 30 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 257 (2002); Samuel Freeman, Distributive Justice and The Law of Peoples, in RAWLS’S 
LAW OF PEOPLES: A REALISTIC UTOPIA? 243 (Rex Martin & David A. Reidy eds., 2006); 
Andrea Sangiovanni, Global Justice, Reciprocity, and the State, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (2007)). 
For an overview of the various positions on this debate, including others not mentioned 
here, such as the equal per capital emissions approach and the idea of subsistence versus luxury 
emissions, see TAN, supra note 101, at 120–33; see also Philippe Cullet, Common But 
Differentiated Responsibilities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 161, 178 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. eds., 2010) (pointing out that even 
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C. How to Share the Burden of Curbing Tax Competition 
Returning to the problem of tax competition, we can see that 
curbing tax competition involves a similar issue of burden sharing. An 
ethical analysis of tax competition includes asking who should bear the 
costs of addressing tax competition and how responsibilities should be 
assigned among countries. In other words, what normative principles 
should apply to the burden sharing of mitigating tax competition? 
Studies in tax competition have often failed to address this issue. Much 
thought has been directed at pointing the negative effects of tax 
competition and finding an effective solution to tackle tax competition, 
but the matter of fairness in how the costs of a solution are distributed 
internationally has been largely overlooked.126 Although a 
comprehensive response to tax competition might be beneficial to most 
countries—and even if we were to assume that this would bring more 
fairness to the international tax regime—, a just solution requires an 
equal concern with fairness in the upshot of institutional reform.127 
I do not attempt to settle the question here. I rather argue that this 
is a much-needed discussion, especially considering the increasing 
efforts of international organizations to achieve cooperation in building 
a more comprehensive and inclusive framework for international 
 
the binding nature of the principle of CBDR remains disputed, as developed countries are wary 
of the implications and long-term consequences of recognizing differential treatment as a 
compulsory principle of international law). 
126. For important exceptions, see supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Avi-
Yonah, supra note 1, at 1650 (suggesting that between two alternative solutions for tax 
competition, a solution that favors poorer countries should be preferred as a matter of inter-
nation equity). 
127. In this respect, fairness might also help achieve cooperation. Research suggests that 
even when self-interest favors cooperation, countries might fail to contribute if they feel the 
distribution of costs is unfair. Scott Barrett, Making International Cooperation Pay: Financing 
as a Strategic Incentive, in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING TO GLOBAL CHALLENGES 
357, 366 (Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceição eds., 2006). This means that a fair distribution of the 
burden can also be seen as an important strategy to establish incentive structures that motivate 
agreement. See Benshalom, supra note 4, at 79–80 (arguing that if a state has confidence that a 
long-term agreement is fair, it might be willing to cooperate whether or not its economic position 
relative to the position of other countries improves); see generally Charles Bram Cadsby & 
Elizabeth Maynes, Voluntary Provision of Threshold Public Goods with Continuous 
Contributions: Experimental Evidence, 71 J. PUB. ECON. 53 (1999) (suggesting that 
compensation encourages compliance and reduces risks of free-riding behavior). 
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taxation.128 Building on the insights of philosophers and legal and 
political scholars developed in the context of climate change, I outline 
below four principles that could independently or jointly guide the 
burden sharing of curbing tax competition: the responsible party pays 
principle, the retrospective beneficiary pays principle, the prospective 
beneficiary pays principle, and the ability to pay principle. 
1. Responsible Party Pays Principle 
One might argue that the costs of curbing tax competition should 
be shared among the countries that gave cause to it in the first place—
let us call this idea the “responsible party pays principle.”129 It builds 
on the idea of reparative justice and asks for accountability and 
responsibility-taking from those who are responsible for harm.130 At 
first glance, this may seem to suggest that the existing low-tax countries 
are responsible for the current international tax scene, and as such, they 
should bear the costs of curbing tax competition. The institutional 
history of the existing international tax regime, however, might suggest 
otherwise. 
The present international tax regime was forged when, in the 
1920s, the League of Nations commissioned a group of experts to 
evaluate how to avoid the problem of double taxation in cross-border 
 
128. An important example is the OECD’s Inclusive Framework on BEPS, an initiative 
launched by the OECD in January 2016 to include the participation “on an equal footing” of 
non-G20 countries, particularly developing economies, in the implementation of the BEPS 
project. Background Brief: Inclusive Framework on BEPS, OECD (Jan. 2017) 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/background-brief-inclusive-framework-for-beps-implementation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4XRN-B3DD] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). Another example is the Platform 
for Collaboration on Tax, a joint effort launched in April 2016 by the IMF, the OECD, the UN, 
and the World Bank to increase cooperation between these organizations on designing and 
implementing international tax standards, providing capacity-building support to developing 
countries, and ensuring a greater participation of developing countries in international tax policy 
discussions and institutions. The Platform for Collaboration on Tax: Concept Note, WORLD 
BANK (Apr. 19, 2016), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/801891468196141038/pdf/104902-SECOND-
REVISION-concept-note-platform-for-collaboration-on-tax.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL36-
GM4F] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
129. This principle resembles the polluter pays principle discussed in the climate change 
debate. Here I adapt the term to the problem of tax competition. 
130. Margaret Urban Walker, Restorative Justice and Reparations, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 377 
(2006). 
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transactions.131 The principles then articulated have since been the 
pillars of international taxation.132 The decision made then resulted in 
the existing international tax regime, a web of inconsistent rules 
exploited by multinationals to avoid taxes.133 It has been argued that 
although policymakers at the time did foresee that this tax regime 
would allow taxpayers to more easily engage in tax avoidance and 
evasion, they were more concerned that an alternative solution would 
harm efforts to liberalize trade and investment, the primary objective at 
the time.134 
This discussion illustrates the most important problem with the 
responsible party pays principle. It requires identifying who is 
responsible and determining how to measure their degree of 
responsibility.135 In this respect, other actors might as well be held 
accountable for the current state of international tax competition. 
Commentators note that low-income economies have oftentimes been 
encouraged by rich countries and by international organizations such 
as the IMF or the World Bank to pursue policies that include low 
taxation of capital.136 Moreover, a broader perspective of the 
 
131. Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated 
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1357, 1358 (2001). 
132. Gabriel Zucman, Taxing Across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate 
Profits, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 123 (2014). 
133. Id. at 124. 
134. See, e.g., Thomas Rixen, From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax Competition: 
Explaining the Institutional Trajectory of International Tax Governance, 18 REV. INT’L POL. 
ECON. 197, 212 (2011). 
135. It is interesting to note that in the case of climate change historical polluters often put 
forward the argument that they were excusably ignorant of the consequences of their actions.  
Bell, supra note 107. This argument cannot be as easily advanced in the case of tax competition, 
as delegates in the League of Nations were already informed in the 1920s that the international 
tax regime then decided would generate international tax arbitrage, but they preferred to avoid 
any potential obstacle to international circulation of capital, seen at the time as “one of the 
conditions of public prosperity and world economic reconstruction.” Rixen, supra note 134, at 
212. As Rixen points out, however, what policymakers could not foresee was that the magnitude 
of cross-border activity and the significance of intangible assets would one day overburden the 
capacities of tax administrations around the globe. Id. at 212. 
136. DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 205; Genschel & Seelkopf, supra note 92, at 69 (pointing 
out that international organizations such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”) often encourage small, resource-poor countries to embrace tax-
haven strategies as a means for accelerating development). It is also important to note that the 
current tax regimes of many tax havens hardly result from an expression of their will as they are 
often “holdovers from the colonial era.” Steven A. Dean, Philosopher Kings and International 
Tax: A New Approach to Tax Havens, Tax Flight, and International Tax Cooperation, 58 
HASTINGS L.J. 911, 936 (2007). 
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international tax regime might suggest that policy choices made by 
developed countries in the last few decades have intensified tax 
competition. The adoption of specific domestic policies of developed 
countries creates international conditions that favor tax competition 
over cooperation, which constrains policy alternatives of less 
developed countries, as multinationals put pressure on them to reduce 
their taxes.137 Indeed, some argue that given the need for tax revenues, 
developing countries would generally prefer not to engage in tax 
competition, but they are compelled to grant tax incentives in response 
to the existing competition.138 
The responsible party pays principle also raises an important 
philosophical problem. A principle based on historical responsibility 
that implies reparations for past wrongs requires justifying why wrongs 
committed in the past should be borne by individuals in the present. 
One needs to justify how perpetrators who are no longer alive can be 
held accountable and how the responsibility can be transferred to 
present individuals simply because of national or generational 
association.139 These issues pose important challenges for a principle 
based on historical responsibility.140 
2. Retrospective Beneficiary Pays Principle 
An alternative but related principle might be drawn in the form of 
the beneficiary pays principle. There could be two different versions of 
 
137. See Christians, supra note 58, at 265–66 (mentioning as an example the United 
States’ “deferral” tax regime, which increases the sensitivity of taxpayers to foreign tax rates). 
The recent U.S. tax reform has substituted the system of worldwide taxation with deferral by a 
system more akin to territorial taxation. Commentators suggest that the new legislation will exert 
even more pressure for tax competition. David Kamin et al., The Games They Will Play: Tax 
Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2018). 
138. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 63, at 63. 
139. For a strong case that it should, see DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND 
GLOBAL JUSTICE 135–61 (2007). 
140. A somewhat “negative” approach to this idea of responsibility was proposed by 
Steven Dean. Steven A. Dean, Neither Rules nor Standards, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 537, 576–
82 (2013). Focusing on global tax revenue allocation among countries, Dean suggests what he 
calls the “Benefits and Burdens Principle,” according to which global tax revenues should be 
shared according “not only to the proportion of the world’s sales that occur in a particular 
jurisdiction but also to a measure of the enforcement assistance it provides to other states.” Id. 
at 578. I consider his benefits and burdens principle a negative approach to the responsible party 
pays principle in the sense that the more a jurisdiction offers in enforcement assistance to reduce 
tax evasion the less responsible it should be held for the current state of tax competition. 
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this principle, depending on how we look at the issue. A first version—
let us call it the “retrospective beneficiary pays principle”—looks at 
the gains and losses generated by tax competition and suggests that the 
past and present beneficiaries of tax competition should bear the costs 
resulting from curbing it. The larger the benefits one gained from 
international tax competition, the larger one’s share of the costs of 
mitigating the problem. 
This version resembles the beneficiary pays principle discussed in 
the climate change debate. It builds on the idea that where a country 
“has been made better off by a policy that has contributed to the 
imposition of adverse effects on third parties, then that country has an 
obligation not to pursue that policy itself and an obligation to address 
the harmful effects suffered by the third parties.”141 Although similar 
to the responsible party pays principle, it focuses on the beneficiaries 
rather than on causation. One could argue that this principle creates 
positive incentives for wider institutional reform due to its rhetorical 
value for a shaming strategy against the current beneficiaries of tax 
competition, which would otherwise be unlikely to cooperate.142 
However, although public shaming by international organizations can 
be effective in bringing about compliance,143 we should not ignore that 
a shaming strategy might result in unprincipled coercion by the most 
powerful states if there are no clear agreed-upon criteria for defining 
relevant concepts such as “tax havens” and “unjust tax competition.”144 
A recent example is the EU’s release of a blacklist of “non-cooperative 
tax jurisdictions.”145 It has sparked criticism for lack of both 
 
141. Caney, supra note 112, at 756. 
142. See, e.g., DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 192–93 (arguing that net winners of tax 
competition have a duty to compensate net losers and suggesting that the main reason to argue 
for these compensatory duties is not actually to see them paid, but rather to deploy them as 
rhetorical device in the fight against unjust tax competition). It is important to note that Peter 
Dietsch’s proposal of compensatory duties does not build on the idea of benefits, but rather 
focuses on the losses generated by tax competition to what he calls the “right holder states.” He 
also does not suggest compensation based on the costs of curbing tax competition but rather 
aims at offsetting the losses caused so far by tax competition itself. Id. DIETSCH, supra note 2, 
at 188–218. 
143. J.C. Sharman, The Bark Is the Bite: International Organizations and Blacklisting, 16 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 573 (2009). 
144. See Christians, supra note 69 (analyzing the OECD’s 1998 Project on Harmful Tax 
Practices and arguing that the guiding principles for intervention in domestic tax policy decisions 
should be explicitly stated and subjected to rigorous analysis and inclusive debate). 
145. The original list and subsequent adjustments are available at Common EU list of 
third country jurisdictions for tax purposes, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 
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transparency and objective criteria as it omits EU members and 
countries commonly regarded as tax havens.146 
The retrospective beneficiary pays principle faces some relevant 
challenges. The first question is whether the principle should be limited 
to current beneficiaries (and current gains from tax competition) or 
whether it should include historical beneficiaries (and past gains as 
well). Second, it might be difficult to determine who the beneficiaries 
are and how to measure the benefits, as such an analysis requires a 
counterfactual exercise, i.e., it depends on hypothesizing what the 
world economy would be like had tax competition (which would also 
need a definition) not taken place.147 Third, the definition of “benefit” 
is problematic. Should it consider the gains and losses of tax revenues? 
Should it include the economic growth resulting from foreign capital 
attraction? Fourth, if we consider the institutional history of the present 
international tax scene, as well as the role of rich countries and 
international organizations in constraining (or influencing) the choices 
of poorer countries regarding their domestic fiscal policies, it seems 
ethically troublesome to suggest that the latter alone should bear the 
costs resulting from the mitigation of tax competition. 
 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en [ https://perma.cc/2FYC-RY67] 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
146.  See EU Blacklist Names 17 Tax Havens and Puts Caymans and Jersey on Notice, 
THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/dec/05/eu-
blacklist-names-17-tax-havens-and-puts-caymans-and-jersey-on-notice 
[https://perma.cc/3ZZL-ACKY]; Francesco Guarascio, EU Adopts Tax Haven Blacklist, British 
Territories Spared, REUTERS, Dec. 5, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-ecofin-
tax/eu-adopts-tax-haven-blacklist-british-territories-spared-idUSKBN1DZ172. See also 
Christians, supra note 69, at 101 (observing that the naming and shaming in the OECD’s work 
on harmful tax competition is problematic and represents the determination of taxing rights of 
sovereign nations by a “relatively small and elite group of individuals”). For general criticism 
of the practice of blacklisting, particularly by supranational institutions, see Lucas de Lima 
Carvalho, The Ills of Blacklisting for International Taxation, KLUWER INTERNATIONAL TAX 
BLOG (Sep. 20, 2018), http://kluwertaxblog.com/2018/09/20/ills-blacklisting-international-
taxation [https://perma.cc/7LH7-75ZT] (last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
147. But see DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 196–201 (suggesting criteria for estimating losses 
originated from each of the three kinds of tax competition: portfolio capital, paper profit, and 
foreign direct investments). 
One may suggest that an estimation in this case might not be needed, since the 
implementation of any given solution for tax competition itself would automatically burden the 
present beneficiaries of tax competition. However, although it is true that the effects of 
implementation would fall on present beneficiaries, the distribution of the burden would not 
necessarily be proportionate to how much each country gains or has gained from tax 
competition, as different alternative solutions for tax competition would produce different 
economic results. 
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3. Prospective Beneficiary Pays Principle 
A second version of the beneficiary pays principle would aim at 
the prospective beneficiaries of the mitigation of tax competition. 
According to this idea, winners from institutional reform should 
compensate losers for their resulting losses. Compared to the first 
version of the beneficiary pays principle, this version suggests an 
almost contrary view. Whereas the retrospective beneficiary pays 
principle tends to favor countries that currently lose from tax 
competition, the prospective version of the principle would favor 
countries that presently benefit from it. The “prospective beneficiary 
pays principle” takes tax competition as the status quo and proposes to 
compensate the prospective losers of institutional reform. It builds on 
the somewhat intuitive notion that who benefits more from a given 
policy should also contribute a larger share in bearing its costs. From 
an ethical perspective, it may be argued that the international 
community has a moral obligation to smooth the transition for net 
losers.148 
An important advantage of this principle seems to be political 
acceptability. Negotiations for major institutional reform often involve 
estimations of costs by prospective losers, which will hardly cooperate 
unless some form of compensation for their losses is ensured.149 To the 
extent that a comprehensive solution for tax competition requires 
cooperation from prospective losers (mainly, low-tax countries), 
compensation based on the prospective beneficiary pays principle 
might be needed to achieve agreement.150 Moreover, from a practical 
perspective, a compromise based on prospective benefits seems more 
feasible than a solution based on the other principles mentioned so far 
 
148. DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 213. 
149. See Genschel & Schwarz, supra note 22, at 355 (“The spread of multilateral 
cooperation is held back by small, low-tax countries either refusing to participate or premising 
their participation on costly side-payments and/or substantive concessions undermining the 
effectiveness of the cooperation.”). 
150. See DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 212 (arguing that a targeted compensation of citizens 
of transitioning tax havens would weaken the feasibility constraints facing the unwinding of tax 
havens and increase the chances of their cooperation in the transition); see also Rixen, supra 
note 134, at 201–02 (analyzing tax competition from a game-theoretical perspective and 
observing that present losers from tax competition would either have to provide side payments 
to current winners or somehow use their power to force them into compliance). But see Dean, 
supra note 136 (criticizing the common assumption that international tax policy is determined 
by “enlightened philosopher kings devoted to pursuing the national public interest” and that 
cooperation would only occur where participating nations were to benefit economically from it). 
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(the responsible party pays principle and the retrospective beneficiary 
pays principle). It is arguably harder to set agreement about who gave 
cause to or has benefited from tax competition than about the 
prospective gains and losses from reform. 
A prospective beneficiary analysis depends on the agreed solution 
for tax competition. The distribution of gains and losses from 
institutional reform will vary significantly according to how tax 
competition is defined and how it will be regulated.151 Indeed, any 
potential solution for tax competition would not “reinstate” the global 
economy to what it “should” be in the absence of tax competition. 
Institutional reform will rather create a new tax order that will change, 
not eliminate, the global competition arena. This means that 
prospective benefits can only be estimated after a specific solution for 
tax competition is determined. Commentators warn about the risk that 
an institutional solution for curbing tax competition may favor richer 
countries.152 If this were the case, a prospective beneficiary pays 
principle should at least alleviate the effects of an unjust institutional 
solution. 
4. Ability to Pay Principle 
The three principles discussed so far consider justice from the 
somewhat narrow perspectives of who gave cause to tax competition 
(responsible party pays principle), who benefited from it (retrospective 
beneficiary pays principle), or who would benefit were it to be 
mitigated (prospective beneficiary pays principle). A recurring 
weakness of these principles is that they are indifferent to the existing 
background inequality and varying abilities of countries to bear the 
burden of institutional reform. Indeed, one might say that the world is 
not only unequal, but it is unequal in a particular way: most of the 
inequality is due to inequality among countries, rather than within 
countries.153 A broader observation of the global economy might 
 
151. Christians, supra note 4, at 833. 
152. See, e.g., DAGAN, supra note 10, at 140; Hearson, supra note 10; Christians, supra 
note 80. 
153. BRANKO MILANOVIC, GLOBAL INEQUALITY: A NEW APPROACH FOR THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION 132 (2016). Milanovic points out that inequality among nations is high enough 
that being born in a rich country matters much more than being born in a rich family and suggests 
the terms “citizenship premium” for those who are born in a rich country and “citizenship 
penalty” for those born in poor ones. Id. at 128, 131. 
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suggest a more comprehensive conception of international justice 
which considers that some countries have more economic needs than 
others. It suggests it might be unfair—and even infeasible—to 
distribute the burden among countries in any way that disregards 
distinct capabilities to bear them. 
The “ability to pay principle” is widely recognized in the tax 
literature as a measure to determine how to share the burden of taxation 
among citizens fairly.154 It builds on the idea that a just tax scheme 
should distinguish among taxpayers according to their relative income, 
taking more from those who have more, so as to ensure that each 
taxpayer bears the same loss of overall welfare.155 It is relevant to note 
that the ability to pay principle is discussed in tax scholarship only as a 
matter of inter-individual equity within a nation, i.e., it is a theory that 
compares inequalities among residents of a given country.156 Here we 
consider it as a matter of inter-nation equity, applying it as a measure 
of fairness between countries. Interestingly, the term “ability to pay 
principle” has been largely used in the philosophical debates on climate 
change as referring to inter-nation equity rather than to inter-individual 
equity.157 
The ability to pay principle applied in the international context 
suggests that a fair institutional reform that involves distinct gains and 
losses for different countries should not aggravate the situation of the 
worse off. This is particularly important as empirical research suggests 
that structural inequalities among countries play a relevant causal role 
in the production and perpetuation of poverty around the world.158 
 
154. See M. Slade Kendrick, The Ability-to-Pay Theory of Taxation, 29 AM. ECON. REV. 
92, 92 (1939). 
155. For a philosophical discussion on the justification of the ability to pay principle in 
the context of domestic tax policy, see LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF 
OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 20–30 (2002). 
156. Even when discussing international taxation, commentators limit the scope of the 
ability to pay to equity among individuals within a country rather than among countries. See, 
e.g., J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International 
Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299 (2001) 
(analyzing how different US policies of taxing residents on their worldwide incomes adhere to 
the ability to pay principle, so understood as fairness among American residents). 
157. See, e.g., Caney, supra note 116; Shue, supra note 117, at 542–43; MOELLENDORF, 
supra note 110, at 173–80; Bell, supra note 107. 
158. See Niheer Dasandi, International Inequality and World Poverty: A Quantitative 
Structural Analysis, 19 NEW POL. ECON. 201 (2014) (suggesting the need for policymakers to 
consider the negative effects of international policies and actions on poverty, rather than 
focusing exclusively on reforms to be undertaken within developing countries). 
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As every state in the world is simultaneously a participant in and 
a potential victim of the global game of tax competition,159 winners and 
losers of tax competition do not compose homogeneous groups. They 
have different structures and varying levels of development, as would 
the potential winners and losers of overall institutional reform.160 
Curbing tax competition will not eliminate competition between 
countries but will rather shift the game to one that relies on other sets 
of advantages in the search for international competitiveness. How 
different nations will be adversely affected by such a change will 
depend on which solution is chosen to address tax competition. The 
different principles for burden sharing mentioned above (the 
responsible party pays, the retrospective beneficiary pays, and the 
prospective beneficiary pays) do not directly consider the different 
capabilities of countries to meet these costs.161 
The ability to pay principle requires that a distribution of a burden 
reduce the advantage of those at the top and prevent existing 
inequalities from becoming worse through the infliction of an unfair 
additional disadvantage upon those at the bottom.162 To ignore these 
inequalities at a time when some countries are still struggling to 
overcome extreme poverty is to disregard their right to economic 
development.163 As some countries suffer from greater structural 
disadvantages than others, international justice requires that the main 
institutions of the global economic order be designed to be fair to poor 
and developing countries.164 
An important question for applying this principle is how to 
measure the development level of affected countries. Should it be 
limited to economic inequality? Should it consider a broader notion of 
development? The concept of development itself has evolved rapidly in 
the development literature,165 and each different conception of the term 
 
159. Christians, supra note 24, at 1375. 
160. For an analysis of the determinants of who wins and who loses from tax competition, 
see Genschel & Seelkopf, supra note 92, at 69. 
161. For an analysis of the structure of the international tax regime as a game between 
parties with asymmetric capabilities, see DAGAN, supra note 10, at 142–84. 
162. Shue, supra note 117, at 540. 
163. TAN, supra note 101, at 123. 
164. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE: DISABILITY, NATIONALITY, 
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165. IAN GOLDIN, THE PURSUIT OF DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOCIAL 
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would suggest a different classification system.166 Possible measures 
include per capita income, purchasing power parities, the Human 
Development Index (“HDI”), the Sustainable Development Goals  
index, the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare, the Happy Planet 
Index, and the World Happiness Report.167 International organizations 
have been using different indicators for this purpose. The World Bank 
uses the gross national income per capita (“GNI/n”) as the basis for 
determining preferential assistance because it considers it to be “the 
best single indicator of economic capacity and progress.”168 The UN 
Development Programme uses the HDI as ultimate criteria for 
assessing the development of a country.169 The International Monetary 
Fund employs a framework based on per capita income, market access, 
and short-term vulnerability, to determine eligibility for concessional 
financing.170 The OECD proposes a broader measurement of well-
being with its Better Life Index, which includes eleven indicators: 
community, education, environment, civic engagement, health, 
housing, income, jobs, life satisfaction, safety and work-life balance.171 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The goal of this Article is not to provide definitive answers. More 
fundamentally, I argue that a solution for curbing tax competition, as is 
the case with any institutional reform, brings about costs that should 
not be excluded from an ethical analysis of tax competition. A 
normative analysis requires thinking about the moral justifications for 
mitigating it, but it should equally include an analytical examination of 
the ethical implications of an institutional solution for tax competition. 
I have suggested four normative principles that could independently or 
jointly apply to the burden sharing of curbing tax competition. Two of 
these principles—the responsible party pays and the retrospective 
beneficiary pays—look at the past and suggest that countries that gave 
 
166. Lynge Nielsen, Classifications of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: 
How It Is Done and How It Could Be Done 4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper, 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1131.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NHH-K5EP] 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2018). 
167. Goldin, supra note 165, at 4–17. 
168. Nielsen, supra note 166, at 10–11. 
169. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2016: HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FOR EVERYONE (2016). 
170. INT’L MONETARY FUND, ELIGIBILITY TO USE THE FUND’S FACILITIES FOR 
CONCESSIONAL FINANCING 1 (2017). 
171. OECD, HOW’S LIFE? 2017: MEASURING WELL-BEING (2017). 
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cause to the problem or have benefited from it should bear the costs of 
overall institutional reform. The other two principles—the prospective 
beneficiary pays and the ability to pay—consider the prospective 
effects of institutional reform in the global economy and the inequities 
that may arise from it. 
Although not definitively advocating which of (or how) these 
principles should apply to the burden sharing of curbing tax 
competition, as well as not excluding other possible principles not 
discussed here, I believe that the complexity of tax competition and the 
heterogeneity of the actors involved might require a combination of 
principles.172 Any solution needs to consider the existing background 
injustices of the international tax system and should thus include the 
ability to pay principle as one of its elements.173 A fair framework for 
tax competition should allow the pursuit of sustainable development in 
the least developed and developing countries rather than create even 
more constraints to these economies. On the other hand, a concern with 
fairness but also with political feasibility might suggest some form of 
compensation for prospective net losers, as it would otherwise be 
difficult—and unjust, as we have seen in Subsections V.B and V.C.3—
to achieve consensus. Therefore, a tentative proposal might be a 
combination of the prospective beneficiary pays and the ability to pay 
principles. 
As suggested throughout Section V.C, several questions remain 
to be answered, such as how to identify and measure past responsibility 
and how to determine beneficiaries and measure their respective 
benefits. More importantly, arguing for a fair distribution of the burden 
requires answering the broader question of why principles of 
distributive justice should apply to the relations between countries.174 
Although a practical conception of inter-nation equity has long been 
 
172. Similarly, Simon Caney proposes a mixed normative principle for the burden sharing 
of climate change, arguing that, although convenient, a simple formula would fail to address the 
complexity of the problem. Caney, supra note 157, at 222. 
173. See Van Apeldoorn, supra note 10, at 491 (arguing that background justice in the 
international context requires the creation of redistributive institutions and suggesting that tax 
revenues from the taxation of multinationals’ income should be shared among states in 
proportion to their GDP or per capita income so as to increase the fiscal self-determination of 
the poorest countries). 
174. On the problem of fairness in the international tax context, see I.J.J. Burgers & I.J. 
Mosquera Valderrama, Fairness: A Dire International Tax Standard with No Meaning?, 45 
INTERTAX 767 (2017) (arguing that fairness in taxation is a disputed and blurred concept and 
calling for the need of more research on global perceptions of fairness). 
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suggested in the tax literature,175 no comprehensive theory has been 
proposed to date to analyze why and how a concept of inter-nation 
equity should guide the normative framework of international 
taxation.176 A broad normative theory of inter-nation equity is needed 
to help illuminate how the international tax regime should relate to 
development, poverty, and global justice.177 
Further research is also needed on how the costs of mitigating tax 
competition should be technically shared. I believe this would greatly 
depend on what solution is to be applied to tax tackle tax competition. 
A distribution of the costs might include, for example, financial 
compensation178 or unequal restrictions on tax competition (i.e., 
limiting tax competition according to the chosen criteria, e.g., allowing 
low-income countries to engage in some forms of tax competition 
under more moderate restrictions compared to high-income 
countries).179 
 
175. Richard A. Musgrave & Peggy B. Musgrave, Inter-Nation Equity, in MODERN 
FISCAL ISSUES: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF CARL S. SHOUP 63 (Richard M. Bird & John G. Head 
eds., 1972). 
176. See Li, supra note 39, at 121–22 (pointing out that the Musgraves did not provide 
any theoretical foundation for inter-nation equity and arguing that the concept should be taken 
seriously in international tax reforms as it provides an “important, and perhaps superior, policy 
framework than the principle of neutralities to guide future reforms”). 
177. See Benshalom, supra note 4 (arguing that the long-term economic relationships 
established between countries give rise to distributive obligations toward foreigners and, thus, 
proposing a theoretical solution that avoids the common philosophical debate between 
cosmopolitans and statists on global distributive justice). For a similar argument in a more 
general context not focused on international taxation, see also David Miller, National 
Responsibility and Global Justice, 11 CRITICAL REV. INT’L SOC. & POL. PHIL. 383, 395–96 
(2008) (arguing that interaction between countries through trade and investment flows, as well 
as cooperation to provide collective goods, raise specific questions of justice and suggesting 
what he calls the “principle of equal net benefit,” according to which “when people belonging 
to separate political communities interact and co-operate to their mutual advantage [ . . . ], the 
costs and benefits of co-operation should be fairly allocated, so that each party receives 
approximately the same net gain”). 
178. An interesting proposal based on financial compensation is advanced by Dean, supra 
note 136, at 965. Dean proposes that “tax flight jurisdictions” (countries which commonly suffer 
from tax evasion and avoidance) negotiate “tax flight treaties” with tax haven jurisdictions, in 
which the latter agree to exchange information while the former commit to financial 
compensation by financing the information infrastructure and sharing a portion of the additional 
tax revenues generated by the tax haven’s cooperation. Dean’s proposal, however, is not based 
on normative grounds. He rather suggests it “stand[s] a greater chance [than some alternative 
proposals] of persuading tax havens to help reduce tax flight.”  
179. See DIETSCH, supra note 2, at 202 (suggesting that in the current state of global 
background injustice, a solution for tax competition could be more permissive with respect to 
developing countries by tolerating their resorting to tax-competition practices). 
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Another possibility would be to incorporate the burden sharing 
element as a factor in what is known as “formulary apportionment.” As 
multinationals today can easily shift income and profits from one 
country (high-tax jurisdiction) to another (low-tax jurisdiction), 
advocates for formulary apportionment propose that the collective 
income of members of a multinational corporate group be apportioned 
among countries according to pre-established formulas, rather than 
considering each of these members as a separate entity as it is today.180 
Since the rights of countries to tax are determined by where the income 
is allocated, formulary apportionment would significantly change the 
current distribution of taxing rights among countries.181 Proposals for 
formulary apportionment mostly suggest a formula based on a 
combination of economic factors, such as the location of sales, payroll 
expenses, and physical assets.182 Different proposals suggest varying 
weights to each of these economic factors.183 An analysis of the fairness 
of each proposal inevitably requires identifying which countries would 
benefit more depending on which of these factors is favored in the 
formula.184 
 
180. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 29, at 39 (“The primary appeal of FA 
[formulary apportionment] is in dispensing with the need to value intra-group transactions, so 
eliminating direct opportunities to shift profits through transfer pricing and other devices. And 
by then allocating the base using proxies to substantial activities, it holds the prospect of aligning 
tax payments more closely with economic fundamentals.”) 
181. See James R. Hines Jr., Income Misattribution Under Formula Apportionment, 54 
EUR. ECON. REV. 108 (2010) (showing that formulas included in proposals for formulary 
apportionment are not strongly correlated with determinants of business incomes); see also 
INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 29, at 39 (suggesting that the primary appeal of formulary 
apportionment is in dispensing with the need to value intra-group transactions, which would 
eliminate direct opportunities to shift profits through the current tax regime). 
182.  Ilan Benshalom, How to Redistribute: A Critical Examination of Mechanisms to 
Promote Global Wealth Redistribution, 64 U. TORONTO L. J. 317, 354 (2014). 
183. Heinz-Klaus Kroppen, Roman Dawid & Richard Schmidtke, Profit Split, the Future 
of Transfer Pricing? Arm’s Length Principle and Formulary Apportionment Revisited from a 
Theoretical and a Practical Perspective, in FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER 
PRICING IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 267, 273 (Kai A. Konrad & Wolfgang Schön Yariv eds., 
2012). 
184. For example, a policy paper issued by the International Monetary Fund estimates how 
the different weights in sales, assets, and employment used in the formula would favor different 
groups of countries (advanced, developing, and “conduit” countries). The paper concludes that 
advanced economies generally gain tax base whichever factor is used and emerging and 
developing economies would gain base only if heavy weight is placed on employment. INT’L 
MONETARY FUND, supra note 29, at 39–40. 
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Explicitly incorporating in the formula one or a combination of 
the normative principles discussed in this Article is more likely to 
achieve fairness in the prospective changes of the international tax 
order. A consideration for the ethics of burden sharing might suggest 
that an apportionment formula should incorporate—among the 
economic factors commonly proposed—additional factors that 
consider the prospective beneficiary pays and the ability to pay 
principles.185 In this case, it would not be unreasonable to initially 
apportion more tax base to both prospective losers and poorer countries 
and gradually reduce the share of prospective losers.186 More 
importantly, a formula that, for example, directly incorporated some 
economic or human development indicator would arguably be more 
suitable to accomplish inter-nation equity, as it would allow a 
discussion of fairness in the formula to be more transparent187 and less 
reliant on estimations that might suffer from data limitations.188 
 
185. Although not focused on the issue of burden sharing discussed in this Article, Ilan 
Benshalom argues that the reallocation of taxing rights is more efficient in promoting 
international wealth redistribution than alternative policies. Benshalom, supra note 182. 
186. As for the ability to pay, the formula should self-adapt. As the development level of 
countries evolve, the changes should reflect in the chosen indicator (e.g., GNI/n or HDI). 
187. A formula based on purely economic factors (such as sales, employment, or assets) 
would likely generate apparently technical disagreements on the economic suitability of each of 
these factors, when the real interests behind these discussions would be which countries would 
eventually gain from one or another allocation factor. For example, it has been observed that 
capital-importing countries might argue for factors based on destination sales while capital-
exporting states might argue for apportionment focused primarily on residence. See Arthur J. 
Cockfield, Formulary Taxation Versus the Arm’s-Length Principle: The Battle Among Doubting 
Thomases, Purists, and Pragmatists, 52 CAN. TAX J. 114, 120 (2004). 
188. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 29, at 40 (stating that data limitations 
prevent calculations of how formulas based on the different economic factors (sales, 
employment, and assets) would impact on developing countries). See also Picciotto, supra note 
79, at 37 (emphasizing the lack of data, especially relating to developing countries, for this type 
of quantification). 
As commentators have pointed out, a formulary apportionment mechanism could be used 
either in a unitary tax regime, where multinationals would disregard intragroup transactions by 
consolidating all their earnings, which would require a major overhaul of the current 
international tax system, or in a separate-accounting regime, which is the system adopted in the 
current treaty-based international tax regime, and which seems more feasible in the present 
scenario. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment: Myths and 
Prospects (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 
221, 2010), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1693105 [https://perma.cc/TV9U-GJKN] (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2018). The idea advanced in this Article of including a burden sharing factor in the 
formula would arguably be applicable in both cases. 
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Interestingly, although there is a rich literature on the 
philosophical and practical problems of a fair distribution of the burden 
of mitigating climate change, the discussion of burden sharing in the 
tax competition literature is nearly non-existent.189 In this respect, it 
should be noted that the different normative principles involved in the 
climate change debate present significant intersections. Those 
responsible for causing the problem (the polluters, which are the duty 
bearers according to the polluter pays principle) are oftentimes the ones 
which have most benefited from it (the beneficiaries, which are the duty 
bearers according to the beneficiary pays principle) and are mostly 
richer industrialized countries (the most able to pay, which are the duty 
bearers according to the ability to pay principle). In contrast, the 
intersection of duty bearers in the case of tax competition is 
significantly narrower. The current beneficiaries of tax competition can 
hardly be regarded as the most economically capable to bear the costs 
of institutional reform. Likewise, the causes of the present state of 
international tax competition cannot be easily assigned to its current 
beneficiaries. This suggests that, philosophical concerns aside, the 
implications of how the burden of curbing tax competition is shared 
should take even more practical relevance. 
As international organizations increasingly move towards 
designing a global framework aimed at reducing tax avoidance and 
mitigating tax competition, the game of tax competition gradually 
changes, shifting the distribution of gains and losses among countries. 
The absence of a serious discussion on how to share the costs of curbing 
tax competition brings about the risk of a distribution based on power 
rather than on principle. As commentators have observed, institutional 
policy decisions tend to reproduce the present imbalance of the global 
power190 and a reform of the international tax order is likely to reinforce 
the existing monopoly of a small number of rich countries over the 
international tax policy.191 The lack of an explicit discussion on how to 
 
189   See supra notes 10, 97-125 and accompanying text. 
190. See BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL AND 
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191. Christians, supra note 86; see Dagan, supra note 10, at 142–84 (arguing that the shift 
from competition to negotiated coordination produces unjust inequalities that derive from 
asymmetries in the relative bargaining power of the negotiating states and suggests that 
restricting tax competition might produce severe distributive effects on poor countries); see 
Hearson, supra note 10, at 5 (pointing out that the track record of global tax governance so far 
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share the opportunity costs arising from the implementation of global 
tax reform might result in countries with less negotiating power bearing 
most of these costs. 
 
suggests that institutional international decisions would likely favor more powerful states); see 
also Martin Hearson, When Do Developing Countries Negotiate Away Their Corporate Tax 
Base?, 30 J. INT’L DEV. 233 (2018) (undertaking a more nuanced analysis of the determinants 
of tax treaty negotiation outcomes, such as government’s revenue base, its reliance on corporate 
tax, investment asymmetries, and knowledge and negotiation experience). 
It is worth noting that since there is no generally accepted baseline of acceptable tax 
competition against which to define harmful tax competition, different countries have been 
defining tax competition based on what shifts the rules in their own favor. Lilian V. Faulhaber, 
The Trouble with Tax Competition: From Practice to Theory, 71 TAX L. REV. 311 (2018). 
